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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Marlin DeWitt appeals from Second Amended Judgment of Conviction stemming 
from a jury finding him guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. Mr. DeWitt asserts that his right to counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution, was violated when the district court summarily denied his request to 
hire alternative counsel without providing Mr. DeWitt a full and fair opportunity to explain 
the conflict he was in with his present counsel. Furthermore, Mr. Dewitt asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence of ten years, with 
three years fixed, in light of the mitigating factors that exist in his case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State filed an Amended Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. DeWitt had 
engaged in felony trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine 
with the intent to deliver, and possession of cocaine, as well as misdemeanor charges 
of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. (R. 34509, pp.16-17.) 1 A preliminary hearing was held, Mr. DeWitt was 
bound over into the district court, and an Information was filed charging him with all of 
the above crimes with the exception of simple possession of cocaine. (R. 34509, pp.18-
1 This Court has taken judicial notice of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcripts in 
State v. DeWitt, Supreme Court docket number 34509. Citations to the record in this 
brief will designate the Supreme Court's docket number associated with the particular 
Clerk's Record. 
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25.) Mr. DeWitt filed a motion to suppress which was denied by the district court, and 
the case proceeded to trial. (R. 34509, pp.37 -45, 49-56.) 
On the morning of the first day of trial, the following exchange occurred: 
MR. FALES (defense counsel): Your Honor, my client arrived this 
morning and explained to me that he wished to obtain different counsel for 
the trial in this matter and that he's not satisfied in the way that I'm 
representing him. And so I thought that it would be appropriate that I bring 
that matter to the Court's attention, and so I did so in the presence of the 
prosecutor and your Honor. 
And I do not know exactly the specifics of the request, but I thought 
that my client should have the opportunity to bring that to the Court's 
attention. 
THE COURT: Mr. DeWitt. 
THE DEFENDANT: I just don't feel I'm - he's working in my best 
interest. I have requested a couple things and neither one of them got 
looked up or checked on. I just don't feel he's doing me '" 
THE COURT: Well, you retained Mr. Fales to represent you in this 
case, correct, Mr. DeWitt? 
THE DEFENDANT: Pardon? 
THE COURT: You retained Mr. Fales to represent you in this case, 
didn't you? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did. 
THE COURT: Mr. Fales, are you ready - are you ready and 
prepared to proceed with this trial today? 
MR. FALES: Your Honor, I am ready and prepared to proceed. 
guess personally would rather not proceed with my client having that kind 
of attitude toward the proceedings. It does give me concern about my 
ability to have him cooperate with me in the conduct of the trial and how 
we should approach the issues that involve cross examination and 
argument to the jury. I do believe we are going to have some problems 
agreeing on how that should best be handled. 
I guess on behalf, I really - I feel obligated to ask the Court to 
continue the trial at this point and give him an opportunity to obtain 
alternate counsel that he feels comfortable with. The trial will obviously be 
a most important stage of this process although we have gone through 
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pretrial motion hearings and so forth, preliminary hearings, I guess I don't 
feel real comfortable proceeding at this point under these circumstances. 
(Tr. Trial, p.?, L.13 - p.9, L.1l The district court asked the prosecutor's position in the 
matter and the prosecutor responded by arguing that the motion is untimely and that 
any delay in the trial would be a financial hardship for Idaho County. (Tr. Trial, p.9, 
Ls.2-22.) The district court ruled as follows: 
THE COURT: Well, I'm also concerned with the timing of this being 
raised at this point in time. I have got a jury panel - and this matter that's 
been pending for quite sometime (sic), I have got a jury panel that I have 
summoned in here to specifically to hear this trial and this is the time set 
aside to hear this trial, and for me to be hearing about this now is simply 
inappropriate. And I still have to be able to address it at this point in time 
and at this point in time I have not heard any specific grounds that would 
allow me to feel comfortable allowing Mr. Fales to withdraw. I have heard 
no grounds given from Mr. DeWitt other than general dissatisfaction that 
Mr. False is working his best interest. 
I'm familiar with Mr. Fales, he's tried cases before me and done so 
in a very competent fashion before. We have proceeded through some 
pretrial motions raising some pretty legitimate grounds on this case 
previously, I have made my rulings on those pretrial motions, so I see 
nothing to support Mr. DeWitt's allegations that Mr. Fales is not working in 
his best interest. And with the lack of any specific grounds for that, I'm 
going to deny the request. And since this matter's been set to proceed to 
a jury trial today, that's what we are going to do. 
(Tr. Trial, p.9, L.23 - p.10, L.19.) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. DeWitt guilty of trafficking in 
methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, was not asked to determine 
whether Mr. DeWitt was guilty of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to 
2 Four separate bound transcripts were created for the appeal in this case (docket 
numbers 34509 and 38556). Citations to the transcript containing the bulk of the trial 
proceedings (testimony, etc.) will include the designation, "Tr. Trial," and citations to the 
transcript of the sentencing hearing will include the designation, "Tr. Sent." Mr. DeWitt 
does not cite to the transcript of the motion to suppress hearing or the transcript of the 
opening and closing arguments in this brief. 
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deliver, and found Mr. DeWitt not guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or 
drugs. (R. 34509, pp.97-10B.) 
At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, and entered a Judgment of Conviction 
accordingly. (R. 34509, pp.115-11B; Tr. Sent.) Later, the district court entered an 
Amended Judgment of Conviction. (R. 34509, pp.120-122.) Mr. DeWitt filed a Notice of 
Appeal timely only from the Amended Judgment of Conviction and his appeal was 
ultimately dismissed. (R. 34509, pp.115-12B; see also Order Dismissing Appeal 
(34509), dated May 19, 200B.) Mr. DeWitt regained his appellate rights through a grant 
of post-conviction relief; the district court entered a Second Amended Judgment of 
Conviction, and Mr. DeWitt timely appealed. (R. 38556, pp.33-37.) 
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ISSUES 
1) Did the district court err when it denied Mr. DeWitt a full and fair opportunity to 
present the facts in support of his request for substitute counsel depriving him of 
his right to counsel protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution as well as Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution? 
2) Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence 
upon Mr. DeWitt in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. DeWitt A Full And Fair Opportunity To 
Present The Facts In Support Of His Request For Substitute Counsel Depriving Him Of 
His Right To Counsel Protected By The Sixth And Fourteenth Amendments Of The 
United States Constitution As Well As Article I, § 13 Of The Idaho Constitution 
A. Introduction 
When Mr. DeWitt attempted to explain the conflict that he was having with his 
counsel, the district court interrupted by asking whether he had retained his attorney. 
The district court did not allow Mr. DeWitt the ability to address the conflict issue any 
further. This failure to provide Mr. DeWitt with a full and fair opportunity to present the 
facts in support of his request for substitute counsel deprived him of his right to counsel 
protected by both the federal and Idaho Constitutions. As such, Mr. DeWitt's case must 
be remanded to the district court in order for the court to conduct the constitutionally 
mandated hearing. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and 
Art. I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel. Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Pharris v. State, 91 Idaho 456 (1967). Regardless of 
whether counsel is retained or appointed, a criminal defendant has a right to conflict-
free counsel. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980). The right to counsel does 
not necessarily equate to the right to counsel of one's choice. See State v. Clark, 115 
Idaho 1056, 1058 (Ct. App. 1989». However, while the decision to grant a defendant's 
requests for substitute counsel is discretionary (see State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896 
(1980», the decision to conduct a hearing wherein the defendant is allowed to explain 
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the nature of the attorney I client relationship and to explain why substitute counsel is 
necessary, is not discretionary. The district court "must afford the defendant a full and 
fair opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of a motion for substitution of 
counsel after having been made aware of the problems involved." State v. Lippert, 145 
Idaho 586, 594 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Clayton, 100 Idaho at 898). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Provide Mr. DeWitt With A Full And 
Fair Opportunity To Present The Facts And Reasons In Support Of His Request 
For Substitute Counsel And Remand Is Required 
Idaho precedent requires that where a court is made aware that the defendant 
may have a conflict with his or her attorney, the court must give the defendant a full and 
fair opportunity to explain the nature of the conflict and, if necessary, the court must 
facilitate replacing the attorney with conflict-free counsel. The district court failed to 
conduct such a hearing in this case. 
In State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 181 P.3d 512 (Ct. App. 2007), the defendant 
asserted on appeal that the district court failed to adequately inquire into his complaints 
about his public defender on two different occasions: first, at a pre-trial hearing and 
second, on the first day of trial. Id. 145 Idaho at 592, 181 P.3d at 518. After reviewing 
the colloquies that occurred on both occasions and the relevant case law (see id., 145 
Idaho at 592-95), the Idaho Court of Appeals held as follows: 
In the present case, the district court responded to Lippert's complaints at 
the pre-trial hearing by explaining its hesitation to replace counsel who 
had been contracted by the county as the public defender and encouraged 
Lippert to "get together" with appointed counsel. The district court did not 
prevent Lippert from voicing his concerns, heard appointed counsel speak 
to the issue, and conducted an adequate inquiry into Lippert's complaint at 
that time. On the morning of the first day of trial, however, Lippert 
protested again, asserting that counsel had spent only thirty minutes with 
him preparing for trial and did not even inform him that the date for trial 
had been rescheduled. Instead of inquiring further and also questioning 
appointed counsel about the validity of Lippert's complaints, the district 
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court merely asked counsel if he had anything to add then proceeded to 
trial when counsel declined to say anything. We are therefore unable to 
determine whether Lippert's complaints were valid. 
Id. 145 Idaho at 595-96, 181 P.3d at 521-22. 
In the present case, when Mr. DeWitt was attempting to explain to the district 
court the nature of the conflict that he was having with his attorney, the district court cut 
him off by asking whether Mr. DeWitt had retained his counsel. (Tr. Trial, p.?, L.13 -
p.8, L.8.) However, a defendant's right to conflict-free counsel is not dependent upon 
whether that counsel was appointed. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (finding 
that there is no basis for drawing a distinction between appointed counsel and retained 
counsel in analyzing whether a defendant's right to counsel is violated due to a conflict 
of interest.) In response to Mr. DeWitt acknowledging that he had retained his attorney, 
the district court merely asked defense counsel whether he was prepared to proceed. 
(Tr. Trial, p.8, Ls.3-10.) Defense counsel stated that he was prepared; however, he 
expressed concerns about proceeding under the circumstances due to concerns about 
his ability to work with Mr. DeWitt on how the defense should proceed. (Tr. Trial, p.8, 
L.11 - p.9, L.1.) Rather than asking any follow up questions of Mr. DeWitt, the district 
court merely requested the prosecutor's response and then ordered the case to proceed 
to trial. (Tr. Trial, p.9, L.2 - p.10, L.19.) Just as in Lippert, the district court denied 
Mr. DeWitt a full and fair opportunity to explain the nature of his conflict with his 
attorney. 
The proper remedy due to the circumstances in this case is to remand the case 
to the district court in order to allow Mr. DeWitt that which he was originally denied - a 
full and fair opportunity to explain the conflict. In Lippert, the Court of Appeals held that 
that case should be remanded in order for the district court to conduct a hearing into the 
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defendant's complaints. Lippert, 145 Idaho at 596. "At the hearing, the district court 
must conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine whether Lippert possessed good cause 
for his request for substitute counsel on the morning of the first day of triaL" Id. "Good 
cause includes an actual conflict of interest; a complete, irrevocable breakdown of 
communications; or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust 
verdict." Id. (citation omitted.) If good cause is found, Mr. DeWitt must be afforded a 
new trial. Id. at 597. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence Upon 
Mr. Dewitt In Light Of The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case 
A. Introduction 
Alternatively, Mr. DeWitt asserts that his unified sentence of ten years, with three 
year fixed, is excessive in light of the fact that this crime was his first felony conviction, 
the steps he has taken to deal with his drug addiction, and the support he has from his 
family and friends. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence 
Upon Mr. Dewitt In Light Of The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case 
Mr. Dewitt asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten 
years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Dewitt does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Dewitt must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 
Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection 
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id., (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)). 
Mr. DeWitt, like far too many individuals who find themselves spending time in 
Idaho jails and prisons, had a '''very bad'" addiction to methamphetamine. (Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) However, unlike many of these individuals 
and as acknowledged by the district court, Mr. DeWitt's addiction was unusual in that it 
developed later in life. (Tr. Sent. p.17, Ls.20-25.) He did not begin using 
methamphetamine until age 44. (PSI, p.7.) His mother, Evelyn DeWitt, informed the 
PSI writer that after Mr. DeWitt's divorce following a marriage of 19 years, he fell apart 
and his drug use had '''a big hold on his life.'" (PSI, p.11.) However, no doubt due in 
part to his age, Mr. DeWitt had an insight into his addiction not often seen with younger 
addicts - he acknowledged that no matter the treatment program, the number one 
factor determining whether an addict with remain sober is that person's understanding 
that it is ultimately up to the individual to choose not to use. (PSI, pp. 7 -8; Tr. Sent. p.11, 
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L.21 - p.12, L.6, p.13, L.11 - p.14, L.2.) The district court acknowledged that in the 
court's experience with the drug court program, "that people are going to get out of that 
treatment pretty much what they put into it" and that the court can "impose some 
sanctions for not doing things right, but [the court] can't make them get welL" (Tr. Sent, 
p.17, Ls.13-20.) Mr. DeWitt's daughter, Kristina Cornia, informed the PSI writer that, 
"she 'has my dad back,'" indicating that Mr. DeWitt had actually made the choice not to 
use drugs. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. DeWitt himself acknowledged that he had '''a big chunk 
under me already,'" apparently referring to his journey to sobriety. (PSI, p.8.) 
While Mr. DeWitt did have some prior misdemeanor and driving infraction 
convictions, the instant offense was his first felony conviction. (PSI, pp.3-5.) He also 
enjoys the support of his family and friends. Ms. DeWitt and Ms. Cornia both wrote 
letters in support of Mr. DeWitt in addition to speaking with the PSI writer via telephone. 
(PSI, pp.11-12: Letters from Evelyn DeWitt and Kristina Cornia.) In general, they 
describe a hard working, caring man who has struggled later in life due to a lack of work 
in his chosen profession of logging, a difficult divorce from his first wife, an unhealthy 
relationship with his girlfriend, and his use of drugs. Id. However, they also noted that 
he had really worked hard at changing his ways since he was charged in this incident, 
and that he had once again become the son and father they had known. Id. 
Additionally, Nicole Lowe, a friend of Mr. DeWitt's for over 30 years, wrote a letter in 
support expressing that Mr. DeWitt is a loving, caring, and patient man, who would drop 
everything to help a friend in need. (PSI: Letter from Nicole Lowe.) 
Idaho Courts recognize that a demonstrated willingness and amenability to 
rehabilitation and the support of family and friends are mitigating factors, and that the 
first-time felon should be granted more lenient treatment than a career criminal. See 
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State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982); 
State v. James, 112 Idaho 239, 243-44 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 
670, 673 (1998). In light of the above mitigating factors, Mr. DeWitt asserts that the 
district court imposed an excessive sentence. He asserts that a unified term of seven 
years, with the mandatory minimum sentence of three years fixed, is a more appropriate 
sentence in light of the nature of his offense and the mitigating factors that exist in his 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. DeWitt respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district 
court with instructions to hold a full and fair hearing on Mr. DeWitt's request to hire 
substitute counsel and, if good cause is shown, to order a new trial. Alternatively, 
Mr. DeWitt respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence to a unified term of 
seven years, with three years fixed. 
DATED this 17th day of November, 2011. 
E 
pellate Pubflc Defender 
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